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Certainty at last?                                                                                        
A “new” framework for electronic contracting in 
Singapore 
Eliza Mik1 
Assistant Professor, 
School of Law, Singapore Management University 
elizamik@smu.edu.sg 
Abstract: Singapore is the first Asian country to accede to the UNCITRAL 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts. Singapore 
is not only the first Asian nation to accede to the CUECIC but also the first nation to 
implement some of its provisions locally. It is these provisions that are the subject of this 
paper. The ETA is significantly wider in scope than the Convention, as it deals not only 
with electronic contracting but also with the use of electronic communications in the public 
sector, the liability of network service providers and the remote authentication procedures.2  
This paper examines how the provisions transplanted from the Convention interface with 
the principles of contract law. Do they create the long-awaited “certainty” in the 
controversial field of e-commerce? As Singapore’s contract law is predominantly based on 
English common law, the problems discussed herein will be encountered in any legal 
system relying on similar principle 
1. Introduction 
 
“The more one looks at the legal issues, the less awesome most of them appear, and the 
less radical the measures needed to ensure that the law does not unnecessarily impede 
e-commerce.”
3
  
 
Singapore is the first Asian country to accede to the UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts4 (“CUECIC” or “Convention”).5 Upon accession, the 
Singaporean Electronic Transactions Act6 (“ETA” or “Act”) was re-pealed and re-enacted in a modified 
version, with effect from 1 July 2010.7 The modified ETA retains the framework of the original ETA but 
adds or amends certain provisions dealing with electronic contracting to align domestic e-commerce 
regulations with the Convention. Accordingly, Singapore is not only the first Asian nation to accede to 
                                                 
1
. Research on this paper was funded by the Singapore Management University Internal Research Project Grant. The 
author remains indebted for the invaluable assistance of Ms Lucia Scheidl-Kornis and Mr Luca Castellani at the 
UNCITRAl Library in Vienna.  
2
 Joint IDA-AGC Review of the Electronic Transactions Act Proposed Amendments, 2009, (“Joint Review”) para 
2.16.3. 
3
 J D Gregory, “Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce” (1999) 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 84 at 85. 
4
 As adopted on 23 November 2005; the Convention relies on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
(“MLEC”), an early e-commerce flagship project dating back to 1996.   
5
 Singapore acceded to the Convention on 7 July, 2010,  
see: www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention_status.html; See generally: A 
H Boss & W Killian, The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (Kluwer Law International, 2008) (“Boss & Killian”). 
6
 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) (Cap 88, 1999 Rev Ed). 
7
 www.ida.gov.sg/Policies%20and%20Regulation/20060420164343.aspx 
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the CUECIC but also the first nation to implement some of its provisions locally.8 It is these provisions 
that are the subject of this paper. The ETA is significantly wider in scope than the Convention,9 as it deals 
not only with electronic contracting but also with the use of electronic communications in the public 
sector, the liability of network service providers and the remote authentication procedures.10  This paper 
examines how the provisions transplanted from the Convention interface with the principles of contract 
law. Do they create the long-awaited “certainty” in the controversial field of e-commerce? As Singapore’s 
contract law is predominantly based on English common law,11 the problems discussed herein will be 
encountered in any legal system relying on similar principles.  
The reader will encounter frequent references to “classic” or “traditional” contract law and “contract 
law applying to electronic contracts.” This terminology is used with great reluctance. It is the very 
creation of a division between the “old” and the “new” contract law that is criticized in this paper. The 
division itself is by no means intuitive or self-explanatory because the two regimes – one “classic” and 
one “pertaining to electronic contracts” – do not exist in parallel. Parallelism would imply the existence of 
a clear-cut choice as to which set of rules to apply. As described below, this is not the case.  The two 
regimes may intersect and interfere with each other, rendering it difficult to analyze the contracting 
process whenever it involves an “electronic” method of communication. 
1.1 Roadmap 
The discussion is divided into two parts: general and specific. The general part criticizes the broader 
assumptions of the Act and provides the conceptual frame for everything that follows. The specific part 
zooms into the individual provisions and examines the extent, if any, to which they facilitate or interfere 
with the analytical framework provided by “classic” contract law. Quotes of explanatory notes or 
legislative reports are kept to a minimum. Those provisions of the ETA that are not directly related to 
contract law and have not been copied from the Convention are out of scope. It must be remembered that 
irrespective of the business model and the contractual subject matter, most legal questions in e-commerce 
are questions of contract law.12 For present purposes, e-commerce is understood as the use of Internet-
enabled methods of communication to form and perform commercial transactions.13  
1.2 Scope: Everything Electronic 
An analysis of the definitions in Section 2 sheds light on the potentially wide application of the Act. The 
term "electronic," which lies at the heart of all interconnected definitions, relates to technologies having 
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic or similar capabilities; "electronic 
communication" means any communication made by means of “electronic records.” The latter indicate 
records generated, communicated, received or stored by electronic means in an information system or for 
transmission from one such system to another; "information system" means a system for generating, 
sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic records. Interestingly, with the exception of 
face-to-face dealings and exchanges of paper letters by traditional mail, all communications at a distance 
are ‘electronic’ as they involve the intermediation of an “information system” or some form of 
transmission or storage of an “electronic record.” With the noted exceptions, all communications at-a-
distance fall under the ambit of the Act. As a result, apart from “facilitating e-commerce,” the ETA may 
affect transactions that would otherwise not be considered “electronic.” A good example is a fax message. 
In Australia which enacted a slightly different version of the ETA in 1999, a fax “falls within the 
                                                 
8
 Singapore was also the first country to enact an Electronic Transaction Act in response to the 1996 Model Law. 
9
 For a more detailed discussion about the differences between the Convention and the 1998 ETA see: Chong Kah 
Wei, Chao Suling, “United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts—a New Global Standard” (2006) 18 SAcLJ 116.  
10
 Joint IDA-AGC Review of the Electronic Transactions Act Proposed Amendments, 2009, (“Joint Review”) para 
2.16.3. 
11
 Singapore follows the common law of contract, see: Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994, Rev Ed). 
 
12
 E A Cavazos, G Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-line World, (MIT Press 1994, 
Cambridge) at p 34; John D. Gregory, supra n 1 at 86. 
13
 See generally:  K C Laudon, C G Traver, E-commerce: Business, Technology, Society (Prentice Hall 2010) 
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definition of “electronic communication” because it is a message sent over phone lines as information.”14 
The same approach would apply to telexes or telephones. The ETA retrospectively subsumes older 
methods of communication under its regime whenever they involve an “electronic element.” It is unclear 
whether such “inclusion” was intended or constitutes an unplanned side-effect of the term “electronic.”  
Difficulties arise in the case of “mixed” interactions, where the contracting process involves a 
combination of traditional and modern means of communication.15 It is unclear whether a single 
electronic message, or the use of an electronic device, would bring all preceding and subsequent 
communications within the scope of the ETA, even if they lack an electronic element, or whether the Act 
would apply to this single message only. If the latter was the case, there could be transactions where some 
communications are governed by the new regime whereas others are governed by traditional rules. If the 
former was the case, then the sending of a single email or SMS during negotiations otherwise conducted 
exclusively by non-electronic means, would trigger the applicability of the ETA and subsume all 
communications relating to the transaction under the modified regime. In sum, the broad definition of 
“electronic record” produces one of two side-effects: two different sets of rules apply to communications 
within the same transaction; or, traditional exchanges are absorbed by a regime tailored to modern (i.e. 
“electronic”) means of communication.  
1.3 Technology Neutrality 
Both the Act and the Convention rely on the concept of “technology neutrality.” Despite its apparent 
importance, the term seems ambiguous16 and little more than a slogan used in arguments justifying the 
regulation of e-commerce.17 Technology neutrality means that the Convention covers “all factual 
situations where information is generated, stored or transmitted in the form of electronic communications, 
irrespective of the technology or medium used.”18 The provisions of the Convention – and consequently 
all laws deriving from it - are supposed to be neutral in that they “do not presuppose the use of any 
technology in particular.”19 Technology neutrality is often difficult to distinguish from media neutrality. 
Media neutrality may be regarded as a subset of technology neutrality as it relates to physical carries 
only,20 whereas technology neutrality seems to be a broader concept encompassing storage and 
transmission methods. Both refer to the alleged independence of legal principles from the technologies 
and media by means of which parties manifest agreement. Both assume that legal principles should 
withhold technological change and not lock the law into a particular technology. They also prohibit the 
discrimination of electronic methods of communication in requiring that they be treated at par with 
traditional methods.  
It is beyond doubt that law should withhold technological change. In this sense, technology neutrality 
constitutes a desirable feature of any regulation. Some legal principles are, however, by their very nature 
not technology neutral. The offer and acceptance model itself has developed around a specific method of 
communication: the post. Moreover, the frequent references to “adapt the law to paperless trade” made in 
the preparatory works leading to the Convention and subsequently the ETA,21 are an indirect 
acknowledgement that contract law often relies on tangible media.22 Paper, while not a legal requirement 
per se, can be regarded as an implicit assumption underlying many legal principles. Given that neither 
technology nor media neutrality are inherent characteristics of contract law, it can be debated whether 
they should constitute guiding principles in the facilitation of electronic contracting. As discussed below, 
many of the substantive provisions introduced into the ETA are not technology neutral as they are either 
                                                 
14
 See: www.ag.gov.au/ECommerce/Pages/Frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx 
15
 D Hettenbach, Das Ubereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen uber die Verwendung elektronischer Mitteilungen bei 
internationalen Vertragen (Mohr Siebeck 2008) at p 41. 
16
 Ch Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement” (2010) I.J.L. & I.T. 18(3) at 249. 
17
 For a detailed discussion of its many potential meanings and legal implications see: Bert-Jaap Koops, “Should 
Regulation be Technology Neutral?” in Starting Points for ICT Regulation, Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-
Liners (ITeR 2006).  
18
 CUECIC Explanatory Note para 47. 
19
 CUECIC Explanatory Note para 47. 
20
 CUECIC Explanatory Note para 48. 
21
 CUECIC Explanatory Note para 48;  
22
 J A Estrella Faria, “Online Contracting: Legal Certainty for Global Business—The New U.N. Convention on the 
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts” (2006) 39 No. 1 UCC L. J. ART 2 at 3 
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tailored to a particular technology or presuppose certain technological features.23 In this sense, they 
discriminate against modern communication technologies by treating them differently. Lastly: the very 
existence of legislation dealing with electronic contracting defies technology neutrality. Can an act 
designed to deal with electronic communications be technology neutral? As one author put it, 
“technology neutrality becomes relevant only after a decision has been made that ‘electronic 
communication services’ require special regulation.”24 Contracts are usually regulated due to their subject 
matter or the weaker position of one contracting party – not because of the communication method used 
in their formation.25   
1.4 “Obstacles” and Formal Requirements 
The Convention and the Act aim to “facilitate electronic contracting” and “remove obstacles to e-
commerce.” Statements like these must be approached cautiously. While it cannot be said that the 
electronic transacting environment does not create any technology-related problems, it is incorrect to state 
that contract law contains any inherent obstacles to electronic commerce. A simple illustration is the 
process of contract formation. There are many ways of forming a contract: parties may negotiate orally, in 
writing or engage in specific conduct. In common law systems, such as Singapore,26 as long as there is 
consideration, certainty and an intention to create legal relations, the promises made during the formation 
process are binding and enforceable.27 The new transacting environment changes nothing in this regard. 
Contract law generally disregards the manner the contract is formed. It is the content of a statement, not 
the manner of its expression or communication that determines its legal effect. Contract law focuses on 
intention. And intention can be expressed in any manner. Its existence is frequently established by using 
the tools of “offer and acceptance.” Whether a particular communication is an offer or an acceptance is 
exclusively a question of intention, which is determined on the basis of construction rules.28 As the offer 
and acceptance model came into being with the advent of the post,29 its application outside the realm of 
paper documents and face-to-face communications does, by definition, encounter problems. The 
difficulties in applying this model are not indicative of its shortcomings but derive from the fact that 
mapping “models” onto real-life situations is inherently difficult. New methods of communication may 
render the “offer and acceptance” analysis more complex but can hardly be regarded as “obstacles” to the 
formation of valid and enforceable contracts. In the words of one author: 
 
“[T]he existing rules and principles need not be changed, let alone replaced or 
abrogated… [t]he difficulty is one of application rather than substantive content as 
such. This is, perhaps, not wholly surprising as, by their very nature, common law as 
well as equitable rules and principles will tend to be stated at a very general level of 
abstraction or universality, thus leaving much scope for actual as well as potential 
application to a large variety of contexts, including one as ostensibly radical as 
cyberspace.”30 
 
Another popular misapprehension is that many legal requirements prescribe the use of traditional 
paper-based documentation or signatures and therefore constitute a “significant obstacle to the 
development of modern means of communication.”31 First, it is difficult to find such “legal requirements” 
                                                 
23
 See Art.8  and the definition of functional equivalents of “signatures”  
24
 Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl, Andrew Charlesworth, Information Technology Law (Routledge 4th ed. 2012) at p 233. 
25
 Donnie, L. Kidd, Jr. & William Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts 
(2000) 26 Rutgers Computer and Tech L J 215, 269; see also: Ch. Reed, “How to make bad law: lessons from 
Cyberspace” (2010) 73 MLR 6. 
26
 Singapore follows the common law of contract, see: Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994, Rev Ed). 
27
 M Furmston, ed., The Law of Contract (Butterworths, 4th ed, 2010) (“The Law of Contract”) at p 255; A Phang, 
Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract (Butterworths Asia, 2nd Singapore and Malaysian Ed, 1998) at pp 
82-83; see also: Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law, OUP 2010, p 414. 
28
 The Law of Contract pp 257-261 
29
 The Law of Contract p 259 
30
 A Phang, T M Yeo, “The Impact of Cyberspace on Contract Law” in Impact of the Regulatory Framework on E-
Commerce in Singapore  (D Seng ed) (Singapore Academy of Law 2002) (“Phang, Yeo”) pp 39-58.  
31
 CUECIC Explanatory Note para 50. 
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within contract law. Formalities, such as writing or signatures, may be required by law (other than 
contract law)32 or by the contracting parties themselves. No formalities whatsoever are required for the 
conclusion or performance of a contract. Absent a general requirement for contracts to be in written form 
or be signed, formal requirements are an exception not the rule.33 After all, “[i]f an oral agreement should 
suffice for the formation of a valid and binding contract, then surely an agreement reached with the use of 
electronic communications should be afforded the same recognition.”34  Statements regarding the 
“enabling” or “validating” purpose of the Act can therefore be questioned. ETA Section 11 is on the 
point: the provision does not create a new rule but confirms that “for the avoidance of doubt, it is declared 
that in the context of the formation of contracts, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed 
by means of electronic communications.” [my emphasis] This declaration would have sufficed to dispel 
any remaining doubts regarding “electronic contracting.” Any further regulation can be regarded as 
redundant. The more so, that those few contracts that do require formalities are specifically excluded from 
ambit of ETA.35 It is also debatable whether any requirements within contract law could hinder the 
development of modern communication technologies. Technology and law develop independently. This 
has been the very problem of the technological progress related to the Internet – technology has 
progressed irrespective of any legal requirements or prohibitions. The best examples are the web itself 
and file-sharing, which came into being despite the existence of copyright. It can only be suspected that it 
is not so much the development but the adoption or proliferation of certain technologies that could be 
affected by legal requirements. To repeat: such requirements are generally absent in contract law.  
Concessions must, however, be made to those who claim that electronic transacting triggers a need to 
modernize law. Existing legislation may in fact be inadequate or outdated in that it does not contemplate 
the use of dematerialized interactions.36 It may not always be possible to accommodate paperless means 
of communication by a creative interpretation of certain legislative provisions. New legislation or 
amendments to existing provisions may therefore be necessary.37 The need to modernize legislation must, 
however, be distinguished from the need to modernize contract law. The latter is predominantly based on 
common law – not statute. “Updating” individual statues must therefore be distinguished from “updating” 
contract law in general. No legislative “updates” seemed necessary to “accommodate” or “facilitate” 
contract formed by means of telex or fax. Broad statements implying the need to change the law to 
accommodate electronic transactions should be narrowed down to encompass the legislative framework 
only. Accommodating developments in communication technologies may require a regulatory response – 
but not a change in contract law.  
1.5  Electronic, Heterogeneous, Diverse 
The term ‘electronic’ permeates legal literature and features in the titles of most Internet-related 
regulations. Being “electronic” does not, however, introduce anything new into the discussion.38 After all, 
both the telephone and the telegraph involve the transmission of electronic impulses. Neither required 
special enabling legislation to “facilitate electronic contracting.” Most challenges in mapping contract law 
onto transactions concluded by novel means of communication derive from the fact that most of these 
communications rely on the Internet. In fact, although the use of the term ‘electronic’ has become a 
convention, it is the Internet that provided the technological “push” for those methods of interaction that 
                                                 
32
 See e.g. Law of Property Act 1925 (UK); Civil Law Act (cap 43, 1985 Rev Ed) (Singapore). 
33
 The Law of Contract p 559. 
34
 S Eiselen, “The Interaction between the Electronic Communications Convention and the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods” in Boss & Killian  p 343. 
35
 Section 4 and First Schedule, exclude the application of the Act to, amongst others, “negotiable instruments, 
documents of title, bills of exchange, promissory notes, consignment notes, bills of lading, warehouse receipts or any 
transferable document or instrument that entitles the bearer or beneficiary to claim the delivery of goods or the 
payment of a sum of money,” “any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in 
such property” as well as to  
“The conveyance of immovable property or the transfer of any interest in immovable property.”  
36
 Tana Pistorius, “Contract Formation: a Comparative perspective on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce” 
(2002) 15 The Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa at 129,130. 
37
 H S K Tan, “The Impact of Singapore’s Electronic Transactions Act on the Formation of E-contracts” (2002) 9 
Electronic Communication Law Review 85 at 85. 
38
 See generally: E Mik, “The Unimportance of Being Electronic – Or Popular Misconceptions About “Internet 
Contracting” (2011) 19 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 324 
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are referred to as “modern.” Arguably, the most pertinent characteristic of the Internet is that it is a 
heterogeneous network.39 Or better: a heterogeneous network of networks. This heterogeneity manifests 
itself at different technical levels. First and foremost, the Internet is a collection of multiple independent 
networks. The core protocol suite underlying the Internet, TCP/IP, ensures basic interoperability between 
different network environments, which otherwise would not be able to exchange data. If the Internet were 
homogenous, uniform and fully interoperable – it would not be called the Inter-net. The prefix “inter-“ 
denotes “between” or “among.” Individual networks often employ proprietary protocols that differ from 
the transport environment of the Internet, i.e. each network may retain some individual characteristics. 
Traversing networks often involves a conversion between the “idiosyncrasies of the two original 
networks.”40 The resulting problems are pertinent in corporate environments, which often deploy different 
internal protocols and formatting conventions frequently leading to situations where messages sent from 
one company cannot be received or displayed by another company.  
Secondly, while the lower layers of the TCP/IP protocol are essentially standardized, individual 
communication services at the application layer (i.e. the layer closest to the user, which “contains” email, 
the web, twitter, blogs etc.) continue to display differences.41 The application layer is characterized by a 
multiplicity of competing protocols and standards. Again, not all of them are interoperable. One email 
application may not correctly display a message sent from another email application; one browser may 
not display a website in the same way as another browser.42 On a practical level, the heterogeneity of the 
component network(s) and the lack of full compatibility at the application layer, translate into a number 
of novel communication risks. The challenges in applying contract law to novel contracting scenarios 
pertain to the necessity of allocating these new risks by means of the existing principles.  
Lastly, heterogeneity can also relate to the diversity of communication methods enabled by the 
Internet. The latter is nothing but a general purpose, open transmission infrastructure underpinning an 
practically unlimited number of different communication technologies, which in turn enable a plethora of 
interactions – from real-time communications, through file sharing, to unilateral data retrieval.43 Some of 
these “interactions” have no equivalent in the real world.  The Internet is more than the world-wide-web 
and email. It encompasses whole new communication platforms, which in themselves provide separate 
infrastructures for interaction. Facebook provides a good example. From its interface, the social platform 
enables at least 3 different communication services: “classic” chatting or messaging (depending on the 
availability of the other party) as well as wall posts and status updates. The catch-all phrase “electronic 
communications” or the generic term “Internet” do not fully reflect the diversity of interactions enabled 
by the network and the richness of the application layer. This wide range of communication methods 
relies on multiple protocols and architectures, each of them characterized by its own idiosyncrasies. A 
provision tailored to email, will not necessarily work for web-based interactions or instant messaging – 
and the other way round.  It is questionable whether the Act appreciates the aforementioned complexities. 
On a more general level, it is questionable whether it is possible to draft legislation to accommodate (i.e. 
provide certainty) all “electronic” methods of communication without compromising clarity, length and – 
technology neutrality. Any of the technological descriptions contained in this paper could be criticized for 
being too simplistic and superficial. All arguments could be embellished with further technical detail. The 
goal, however, is not to copy textbooks on data networks or digital communications. The goal is to 
illustrate the difficulty of drafting provisions that can apply to multiple technologies and various 
permutations of technological features. 
                                                 
39
 E Hall, Internet Core Protocols: The Definitive Guide, Cambridge 2000, Chapter 1, An Introduction to TCP/IP, par 
1.1.3; RFC 1594, Answers to Commonly Asked “New Internet User” Questions, A Marine et al (1994)  
40
 J. Glenn Brookshear, Computer Science, An Overview (8th edn Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston 2004) p 138 
41
 For an excellent description of the differences between the individual layers, with particular emphasis on the 
diversity of the application layer, see: Craig McTaggart, “A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis” (2003) 
McGill L.J. 571 at 578-580 
42
 See generally: E Mik, “Some Technological Implications for Ascertaining the Contents of Contracts in Web-based 
Transactions” (2011) 27 CLSR 368. 
43
 For a description of the “generative” properties of the Internet as a platform for new technologies see: Jonathan 
Zittrain, The Future of the Internet (Yale University Press 2008). 
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2. Zooming in 
The following sections discuss the four substantive provisions of the modified ETA. The potential impact 
of these provisions must not be underestimated: they must be included in legal analyses of contract 
formation whenever the intention of one or both parties is manifested by electronic means. The formation 
process determines the contents of the contract and the contract’s very existence. These initial stages are 
therefore particularly vulnerable to any interference. Even the smallest inconsistency in the formulation of 
a provision or a minute change in the applicable default rules will send ripple effects across the whole 
transactional landscape of e-commerce and - given the broad reach of the Act - contract law as a whole.  
2.1 Section 13 – “Dispatch” and “Receipt” 
Section 13 follows Article 10 of the CUECIC and establishes when and where electronic communications 
are deemed dispatched or received. The provision does not deal with the legal effect of a message (e.g. 
whether it constitutes an acceptance or an acknowledgement of receipt) but only with the mechanics of 
dispatch and receipt.44 Neither does it address the question whether acceptances communicated by 
electronic means are subject to the principle of receipt or to the postal acceptance rule. Given the lack of 
consensus and the difficulty of devising a single rule to govern all forms of electronic transactions, it was 
proposed not to include any provision stipulating the substantive rules regarding contract formation.45 It 
was emphasized that the introduction of a definitive rule regarding the effectiveness of acceptances would 
create a duality of regimes.46 The absence of such rule, however, is unfortunate given the uncertainty in 
this area and the ongoing academic debate regarding the time of formation of contracts concluded 
electronically.47 It is also unclear why the drafters (of both the Act and the Convention) founded their 
argument on the “fear of creating a duality of regimes” given that other provisions create such duality.  
The classic rules on formation are clear: a contract is concluded when an acceptance becomes 
effective. Effectiveness may be tied to receipt (the receipt rule) or to dispatch (the exception, called the 
postal acceptance rule).48 Dispatch is traditionally associated with posting. As no distinction is made 
between delivering a letter to the post office or placing it in a mailbox in the street, the exception burdens 
the addressee with the risk of all accidents during the time letters remain in the sender’s mailbox and their 
subsequent transfer. Acceptance is effective even if a letter is lost during these initial stages. In the case of 
telegrams, dispatch occurs at the office where the machine is located.49 Receipt is generally associated 
with the arrival of a message at the addressee’s machine.50  In traditional communications courts devote 
limited attention to determining the precise point of formation or defining the words “dispatch” and 
“receipt”, as there is usually only one place or one machine that must be taken into consideration. As 
most electronic communications rely on the client-server architecture, e-commerce transactions may 
involve (at least) two machines on each side of the transmission channel and therefore two potential 
points of contract formation. This picture may be further complicated in the case of mobile 
communications, which add another possible endpoint to the picture. There is also the question of 
communication risks. While the principle of receipt and the postal exception constitute basic tools of risk 
distribution, the latter requires further refinement in light of the increased risk in networked 
communications. Transfers between different network environments often require that messages – or 
informational content in general – be processed in order to enable delivery and display. Whenever content 
is processed, there is a risk that it will be interfered with and/or rendered illegible. As one author 
described it: “[i]n the electronic world there may be more intermediaries, and more addresses, and more 
                                                 
44
 W Kilian, Comment on CUECIC Article 10 in Boss & Killian at p 163. 
45
 Joint Review, para 2.12.3,  
46
 See generally: Phang, Seng, Yeo, who stated that it would be best for the Electronic Transactions Act to establish 
which rule should apply, at paras 15 & 42. 
47
 See e.g.: P Goodrich, “The Posthumous Life of the Postal Acceptance Rule’ (2005) Benjamin N Cardozo School of 
Law, Working Paper No 127; J Hogan-Doran, “Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: the When and Where of On-line 
Contracts” (2003) 77 ALJ 377; S Hill, “Flogging A Dead Horse – The Postal Acceptance Rule and Email” (2001) 17 
JCL 2; P Fasciano, “Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule” (1997) 25 Hofstra L Rev 971. 
48
 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381; Adams v Lindsell (1818) B & Ald 681. 
49
 Henkel v Pape (1870) LR 6 Exch 7; Bruner v Moore [1904] 1 Ch 305; Cowan v O’Conner (1888) 20 QBD 640 at 
642; Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 38. 
50
 Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Brinmes’ (The Brinmes) (1974) 3 All ER 88 at 93. 
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hazards to delivery than for paper.”51 Consequently, “dispatch” and “receipt” not only determine the time 
of formation but also allocate communication risks in that they establish the point in the communication 
infrastructure at which risk is transferred from sender to addressee.  
Section 13 states that “dispatch” occurs when an electronic communication leaves an information 
system under the control of the originator. “Receipt” takes place when the communication becomes 
capable of being retrieved by the addressee, which is deemed to occur when it reaches the addressee’s 
electronic address.  
The potential problems inherent in this wording are best illustrated by email. Email involves the 
sender’s mail-client and outgoing mail-server as well as the addressee’s incoming mail-server and mail-
client. The exact moment of formation depends on whether it is the server or the client that is considered 
relevant.52 There is no direct transmission between mail-clients, i.e. from the computer of the sender to 
the computer of the addressee. Email is first sent to a mail-server “associated” with the sender, then to a 
mail-server “associated” with the addressee, and then finally to the addressee.53 Only mail-clients are on 
the parties’ computers and therefore under their control.54 Mail-servers are often operated by Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) – hence the term “associated” instead of “owned” or “run.” How, then, do 
ISPs fit into the analysis? Telecommunication carriers and the post are generally regarded as independent 
third parties, which provide the communication infrastructure. With effectiveness on dispatch, 
‘transmission’ commences when letters are placed in the mailbox, which constitutes part of the postal 
system. The latter frequently enjoys the status of a public utility and is subject to strict regulatory service 
obligations. In other words, risk passes when and – assuming the postal acceptance rule applies – the 
contract is formed when the letter is out of the sender’s hands: in the mailbox operated by the postal 
service. Should ISPs be treated like the post and mail-servers like mailboxes? Depending on the answer to 
this question, the time of formation will vary significantly as there may be delays between the time 
messages are transferred between mail-client and mail-server. Also, mail-servers may “crash” and prevent 
messages from being dispatched or reaching the addressee’s client machine. Different problems will arise 
depending on whether one analyzes the sending or the receiving sequence in a transaction. The question is 
always: when does transfer of risk occur? Intuitively, the answer is simple: mail-servers are not mailboxes 
and ISPs are not independent third parties, comparable to the post. Each party chose its ISP and remains 
in a contractual relationship with it. Despite having no actual, technical control over the mail-server, each 
party must assume the perils of the ISPs bad performance, including any malfunctioning of the mail-
server. To claim otherwise would produce an illogical result: the addressee would bear the risks of 
operation of the sender’s outgoing mail-server and the sender would bear the risk of operation of the 
addressee’s mail-server.  It must be remembered that ISPs provide a service that, from a purely technical 
perspective, can be undertaken by the parties themselves. Only if Internet connectivity and mail-servers 
were always and exclusively provided by a universal telecommunications provider, such ‘ISP’ would bear 
similarity to the post.55 Entering the ISP’s mail-server would be synonymous with loss of control, 
comparable to placing a letter into a mailbox.  Given, however, that [many isp and can do oneself] the 
client and the server must be regarded as a single unit for which each communicating party is responsible 
in its entirety. Message transfers between mail-clients and mail-servers as well as the parties’ frequent 
lack of actual control over the mail-server should be disregarded. This approach can be further 
strengthened by the fact that many companies do in fact run their own mail-server(s). Introducing a 
distinction based on control would differentiate the time of formation depending on whether a party 
operates its own server or not. Although Section 13 and its accompanying literature seem to emphasize 
actual control of the communication infrastructure,56 the provision must be interpreted in light of the 
above observations. 
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 W Kilian, Comment on CUECIC Article 10 in Boss & Killian at 177. 
52Technically, servers and clients are processes, not discrete pieces of machinery. Frequently their separation is only 
logical. 
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 David D. Clark, Marjory S. Blumenthal, “The End-to-end Argument and Application Design: the Role of Trust” 
(2011) 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 357 at 359. 
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 I disregard whether the sender uses a shared computer and whether the mail-client takes the form of a browser, as 
in the case of web-mail, or a dedicated email application, such as Outlook. 
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 G B Delta, J H Matsuura, Law of the Internet (Aspen Publishers, 2nd ed. 2005) online para 3-10 
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“Receipt” is associated with ‘capability of being retrieved’, which (in the case of email) indisputably 
points to the addressee’s mail-server as messages are retrieved from storage spaces on mail-servers.57 
Section 13 could be interpreted as separating the mail-server from the mail-client in the case of dispatch 
but treating them as one unit for the purposes of receipt: dispatch equals loss of control, receipt equals 
ability to retrieve. In the case of email, given that the mechanism is similar, the definition should be 
mirrored on both sides of the communication channel or be more consistent with the actual functioning of 
this communication method. The discrepancy is likely to be the result of the fact that the provision applies 
to various methods of communication. The “capability of being retrieved” seems, however, ill-fitted for 
web-sites. As the contents of every web-site are hosted on a web-server and await retrieval, they are – by 
their very nature - always capable of being retrieved! Accordingly, they are always “received.”  
Furthermore, how does one “retrieve” a status update on facebook or an instant message on skype?  In the 
case of the aforementioned communication methods, a more appropriate term would seem to be 
“displayed.” 
To complicate matters, when defining “dispatch” Section 13(1)(a) refers to “parties who send 
messages on behalf” of the originator and points to communication intermediaries.58 In the case of 
receipt, “persons acting on behalf” are not mentioned. Section 2 (1) defines “originators” of electronic 
communications as parties who, or on whose behalf, an electronic communication has been sent and does 
not include a party acting as an intermediary. “Addressees” are described as parties who are intended by 
the originator to receive the electronic communication, but do not include intermediaries.59 The 
explanatory notes emphasize that the “addressee” is the person with whom the originator intends to 
communicate, as opposed to any person who might receive, forward or copy the message. The 
“originator” is the person who generated the message even if that message was transmitted by another 
person.60 This implies that intermediaries belong to the sphere of control of originators or addressees 
respectively. While this seems to be the correct approach, it is not compatible with references made to 
‘control.’ It also misaligned with statements indicating that Section 13 transposes traditional rules onto an 
electronic environment.61 If the “control” test is applied verbatim and if postal communications are used 
as a point of reference, then dispatch of an email occurs when it leaves the mail-client.   
One might ask: if “control” is not a correct term, what wording would be more adequate? It is not 
“control” by itself that creates interpretive difficulties. It is “control” combined with the vague 
“information system.” The latter denotes the “entire range of technical means used for transmitting, 
receiving and storing information”62 and does not distinguish between clients and servers63 or between 
any elements of such systems. The broad definition (“entire range”) renders analysis even more difficult 
as it points towards a further point in the network – not just the mail-server. The “information system” 
provided by an ISP includes a network as ISPs provide not only mail-servers but first and foremost 
connectivity to the Internet. Technically, the network of the ISP “ends” at the router, which interconnects 
its network to another network closer to the Internet backbone. Consequently, it can be said that loss of 
control occurs when the message leaves the network of the ISP associated with the originator. The 
discussion could be enriched with more technical detail, accounting for the fact that servers and routers 
operate at different levels (i.e. layers) of the communication infrastructure. Given the lack of clarity 
whether “information system” should be approached from a physical (hardware) or from a conceptual 
(software protocols and functions) perspective, “control” and “information system” are ambiguous. 
Notably, “information system” is used only in the provision concerning dispatch. When defining 
“receipt,” it is replaced with “electronic address.” The latter concept is significantly narrower than the 
former and makes it easier to pinpoint the exact time of formation. In the case of email, it also confirms 
that it is the mail-server that must be taken into account when establishing receipt as it indicates a specific 
                                                                                                                                               
communications) – the message never leaves the control of the sender and receipt occurs when it is received; see 
Section 13 (1) (b).  
57
 With certain types of email accounts (gmail, hotmail) retrieval is not necessary as messages are only accessed, not 
downloaded on the client machine.  
58
 W Kilian, Comment on CUECIC Article 10 in Boss & Killian at 170. 
59
 CUECIC Explanatory Note 99. 
60
 CUECIC Explanatory Note 98. 
61
 CUECIC Explanatory Note 171. 
62
 CUECIC Explanatory Note 101. 
63
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location within the information system. At the same time, it is difficult to apply in web-based interactions 
as they usually do not involve an address. 
Complications also arise from the division into “designated” and “non-designated” electronic 
addresses. When messages are sent to “non-designated” addresses, receipt occurs when the message 
becomes retrievable and the addressee becomes aware that the message was sent to such address.  
Allegedly, “awareness” is more “equitable than holding the addressee bound by a message sent to an 
address that the addressee could not reasonably expect would be used in the context of its dealings with 
the originator or for the purpose for which the data message had been sent.”64 At the same time, it was 
admitted that “awareness” gives power to the addressee to effect receipt and places a heavy evidential 
burden on senders.65 Awareness is a difficult-to-prove, subjective factor, which is bound to create 
uncertainty in mass-market commercial transactions and place originators at the mercy of addressees.66 
Moreover, none of the traditional principles governing the time of contract formation refers to any 
subjective factors on the side of the addressee.  The concept of “designation” does not form a component 
of the principle of receipt or the postal exception.  Concerns associated with the sending of massages to 
non-designated addresses,67 were justified in 1996 (when the MLEC, the predecessor of both the Act and 
the Convention was drafted) as email and electronic communications were a novelty and “consumers 
could not be expected to check their electronic mail regularly.”68  It is questionable whether such 
concerns remain valid in an era where pervasive connectivity and the proliferation mobile devices enables 
24/7 access to email and instant messaging accounts.  
Neither the Convention nor the Act clarifies how designation is to take place. While “it would not be 
reasonable to expect that the addressee, e.g. large business entities, should pay the same level of attention 
to all the electronic addresses it owns,”69 it must also be assumed that once an address is held out or 
disseminated, any communication send to it should be effective. With this default rule in mind, situations 
where a commercial message, such as an offer or purchase order, is sent to an email address labeled 
“complaints” or “feedback” should be looked at in casu. The current wording raises the broader question 
whether a company maintaining a website with various email addresses should be expected to monitor all 
of them. Should messages sent to the “incorrect” address be internally redirected to the correct 
department? The concept of “designation” seems to complicate business communications on the Internet 
and is not consumer friendly. Associating receipt with “awareness” in the case of non-designated 
addresses is a step back in comparison with the previous version of the provision in ETA’98, which tied 
receipt in non-designated systems to actual retrieval. The latter constituted an objective and easy-to-
determine event. It appears questionable whether the development of special addressing rules provides 
certainty in on-line contracting. “Designation” obligates senders to investigate the correct address without 
imposing an equivalent obligation on addressees to clearly indicate the electronic address they can be 
contacted at. If an address is held out to receive communications, its designation should be implied. To 
achieve certainty, “designation” should be defined or the concept should be abandoned altogether.  
The use of the verb “reach” instead of “enter” in the provision concerning receipt is technically 
incorrect. According to Section 13, messages are presumed to be capable of retrieval when they reach the 
addressee’s electronic address.70 This wording disregards the fact that messages may reach the system, be 
rejected by a protective measure (such as a filter or firewall) and not become retrievable. Receipt would 
occur despite such rejection.71 Spam filters, virus checkers may be deployed at the receiving end point of 
the mail transfer or “in the middle,” at one of the relay points.72 Frequently, there may be a legal 
obligation, express or implied, to keep the network and the resources stored thereon secure. The 
deployment of security measures is therefore a necessity. The only practical question is whether the 
security settings in a given communication scenario were reasonable in light of the resources being 
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65
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 Joint Review Stage 1, para 5.7. 
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 W Kilian, Comment on CUECIC Article 10 in Boss & Killian at 169. 
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71
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protected. Such issues must be decided in casu. The term “reach” – which is copied from CISG Article 18 
– does not fit this technical reality and effectively precludes any analysis whether the security measures 
were reasonable and the rejection of a message should be regarded as justified. One might accuse the 
drafters of not fully addressing all possible scenarios regarding the deployment of security measures.73 At 
the same time, it must be acknowledged that allowing for all scenarios is virtually impossible, given the 
large number (and type) of possible configurations. Rather than prescribing inflexible default rules, 
situations in which messages have been rejected or lost must be examined individually. At present, such 
individual examination is precluded by the term “reach” in Section 13. The “capability of being retrieved” 
should be tied to “entry,” as messages must enter a system - not just reach it - to become capable of 
retrieval. Needless to say, the word “reach” is virtually pointless in the case of interactions occurring 
through a web-interface. Generally – at least from the perspective of the person visiting the website - the 
information must be displayed to be communicated.  
Lastly, Section 13 ignores the problem of the potential illegibility of messages due to system 
incompatibility. Receipt occurs when a message is capable of being retrieved. A technically correct 
solution would associate receipt with the capability “of being processed.” This was the original wording 
in the MLEC (Article 15) and the ETA’98. Both “processability” and “legibility” seem closer to the 
classic principle that acceptance must be communicated – a principle resting on the assumption that the 
addressee will know of the acceptance of his offer. One remains sceptical whether Section 13 transposes 
existing principles onto electronic scenarios. Given the difficulty of its application to basic email 
exchanges, it can be questioned whether it will accommodate more complex communication methods.  
How would it apply where the “information system” was distributed, as in cloud computing architectures? 
The latter are characterized by the “information system” being device- and location-independent.  How 
would it apply to Facebook interactions, which occur in a closed communication platform but at the same 
time involve geographically dispersed clusters of hardware? In sum, the mechanism presented in Section 
13 is limited assistance for email interactions, and will most likely fail on web-based transactions – unless 
the section is interpreted in a very creative manner that takes into account the actual functioning of the 
communication method in question.   
2.2 Section 14 – Offer and Invitation to Treat 
Section 14, implementing CUECIC Article 11, provides that a proposal to conclude a contract made 
through electronic communications which is not addressed to one or more specific parties but is generally 
accessible to parties making use of information systems (including proposals that make use of interactive 
applications for the placement of orders through such systems) is deemed to be an invitation to make 
offers, unless it clearly indicates the intention of the party making the proposal to be bound in case of 
acceptance.  A presumption is created that websites, or statements made thereon, are not binding. 
Interestingly, such presumption does not exist in contract law. Whether a statement is binding or not is 
solely a question of intention – not the manner of expression. It is not immediately apparent why a 
statement made on a website should be subject to different rules of interpretation than the same statement 
made in a newspaper or verbally. It is the content of a statement, not the method of its communication that 
determines its legal effect. To recall the basics: offers indicate a definite willingness to enter into a 
contract without further negotiations. Invitations to treat are non-binding indications of a general 
willingness to contract.74 Offers can be accepted by a single act of acquiescence because they contain all 
the required contents of the contract, i.e. they are certain and complete. 75 Invitations lack the required 
completeness and can be regarded as requests to submit offers. Being non-binding by nature, they give 
the maker of the statement the ultimate choice whether to contract or not.76 The distinction between offers 
and invitations depends exclusively on the intention of the maker of the statement and is inferred from the 
words in the context in which they are used.77  
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Invitations shield the maker of the statement from the risk of ‘over-acceptance,’ i.e. the inability to 
perform when the number of acceptances exceeds the number of items on stock.78 Assumedly, the 
recurring emphasis on this ‘protective’ function of invitations derives from a number of cases where a 
website displayed incorrect pricing information and the vendor was obliged to sell its goods at the 
incorrect, significantly lower price. The presumption embodied in Section 14 can therefore be regarded as 
a safeguard against computer errors, which are an undesirable but unavoidable side effect of the 
increasing complexity of information systems. An example of such error is provided by Chwee Kin 
Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd, where a website offered professional printers for 66 S$ instead of S$ 
3000.79 Proponents of the presumption disregard the fact that the protective function of invitations to treat 
is not required in e-commerce transactions. The risk of over-exposure can easily be prevented by 
technological means: applications can be programmed not to accept orders of goods low on stock and 
dynamically change product information to reflect the number of items available. With digital products, 
e.g. music and software, the risk of over-acceptance is absent altogether as the supply of such “products” 
is infinite. Lastly, the website operator can protect himself by explicitly stating that the website does not 
constitute an offer. A simple disclaimer is as effective as a technological measure. In practice, e-
commerce is dominated by browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts, where the entire formation process is 
confined by a rigid transacting interface. It must be noted that the last act in a transacting sequence need 
not necessarily constitute acceptance. In a typical B2C purchase, the customer must insert/select the 
required amount or description of the goods/service in question as well as provide delivery and payment 
details. Quite often he or she must also explicitly or implicitly agree to a set of standard terms. The latter 
often determine the legal character of the response expected from the other party or state who makes the 
acceptance.80  
The discussion could end here. Given the large interest generated by the issue at hand, some 
additional observations are apposite. Section 14 can be regarded as an example of misplaced focus. It 
cannot be denied that websites are comparable to virtual shop displays, mail-order catalogues or 
traditional advertising in mass media, all of which are routinely regarded as invitations.81 Both 
advertisements and shop displays, however, may constitute offers if they are sufficiently certain to allow 
the inference of intention.82 There is no legal presumption that a shop display or an advertisement is 
always an invitation. More importantly, websites can also be compared to vending machines, which are 
generally regarded as offers.83 An intention to be bound is expressed by displaying the machine and 
delivering the product or service to anyone who inserts the coin.84 The resemblance to vending machines 
is particularly strong, when the delivery of a digital ‘product’ or service occurs directly on or from the 
website.85 In this sense, amazon.com or iTunes are nothing but giant, sophisticated vending machines 
with the user interface taking the form of the webpage displayed in the browser window and the delivery 
mechanisms taking the form of database servers operating in the background.  
The legal effect of a statement does not depend on the number of addressees. It is trite law that if an 
offer is made to the public at large the offeror becomes liable to the person who accepts, not to 
everyone.86 Although websites are potentially available to anyone with an Internet connection, they are a 
pull medium, i.e. a website must be specifically requested before it displays on the computer screen. In 
this sense, websites do not resemble publicly displayed billboards, which are virtually impossible to avoid 
by anyone within their line of sight. A website is not broadcast - it is requested. Its “reach” is limited to 
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those who specifically type in the URL or follow the requisite link. Otherwise it remains hidden from 
view. One must therefore remain skeptical about statements implying that the legal character of a website 
is (or should be) affected by its “unlimited reach” or “unlimited number of addressees.” Skepticism is also 
warranted when analyzing the popular question “are website advertisements binding?” Not every website 
is an advertisement. The starting point of any analysis is the intention expressed by a statement. The 
question should be: is this statement intended to be binding? and not: is this statement an advertisement, a 
shop display or a vending machine?87 According to the principle of technology neutrality, the legal effect 
of a statement should not depend on the manner of its expression. Technology should not eclipse content. 
Contract law is only concerned with the question whether the maker of a statement wanted to be bound – 
not whether he addressed it to a specified number of addressees or whether the resulting contract could be 
performed immediately. The ability to immediately perform the contract is not a prerequisite of an offer 
and need not indicate an intention to be bound. 88  The introduction of a presumption unnecessarily 
prejudices the analysis and alters well-established rules. One author, who addressed the issue before the 
new ETA was enacted, described the introduction of a default rule as an “unusual statutory 
development.”89   
2.3 Section 15 – Automated Transactions 
Following CUECIC Article 12, Section 15 asserts that contracts formed through the use of automated 
systems are valid and enforceable, even though no natural person had reviewed the action of the systems 
or output of its operations.  Allegedly, such provision is necessary to “give legal effect to the acts of 
electronic agents, which are increasingly used in e-commerce.”90 Notably, ETA’98 dealt with problems of 
automation under “attribution.” According to Article 13, an electronic record was deemed to be that of the 
originator if it was sent “by an information system programmed by or on behalf of the originator to 
operate automatically.” Given the continuing debate on the topic, it is worthwhile discussing the 
contractual aspects of “automation” in more detail. Despite the fact that web-based transactions have been 
at the heart of e-commerce for more than a decade,91 it is frequently being implied that contracts 
concluded with the assistance of computers92 require a theoretical framework justifying their validity. 
Multiple theories propose the “emancipation” of computers93, possibly as a response to their increasing 
sophistication.94 Once statements are not merely transmitted by computers but also generated by them, it 
becomes difficult to attribute these statements to the persons operating such computers (“operators”).95 
The main source of doctrinal discomfort is “autonomy:” the old vending machine morphs into an 
“intelligent” system that forms its own decisions96 and acts on the basis of its own experiences.97 This 
leads to the conclusion that “autonomous” (i.e. sophisticated) computers should be separated from their 
operators and endowed with legal capacity. In other words, automated transactions are “validated” by 
emancipating the computer or comparing it to an agent. Both approaches serve to distinguish between 
those ‘automated contracts’ that should bind the operator from those, which should not.98 Separation 
theories attribute computer-generated output to the computer to protect the operator from the 
consequences of unplanned or incorrect operations. As a result, it becomes necessary to grant legal 
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capacity to the computer - otherwise there is nobody to be held accountable. This approach, however, 
renders it difficult to attribute the correct output to the operator.  
The above theories can be rejected on a number of grounds. As a starting point, unplanned output is 
not synonymous with incorrect output. Software is by nature unreliable.99 A corollary of technical 
sophistication and self-learning algorithms is that computers may produce transactions unfavorable to the 
operator, such as issuing a purchase order at a price that exceeds an amount acceptable to him. 
Unfavorable transactions may, however, be the product of correct operations. The difference lies only in 
the subjective perception of the operator. Objectively, from the perspective of the person transacting 
“with” the computer the output produced by a malfunction may be identical to the output produced by the 
correct operation. Theories relying on “autonomy”100 also ignore the fact that a computer is autonomous 
because it was programmed to be autonomous. It did not self-acquire this feature. It is always a human 
person who instructs and controls a computer. There is no justification - theoretical or otherwise - for 
technical sophistication to translate into legal capacity. It is therefore not a question of establishing what 
computers must be able to do for the law to treat them as persons.101 Legal capacity is not a function of 
technological advancement. Moreover, as computers do not “have” assets, it does not matter whether they 
have legal capacity.102 The only asset susceptible of economic evaluation is the software or hardware - 
owned by the operator.  
A parallel trend, based on the fact that computers can be programmed to respond with a complexity 
close to human,103 compares computers to agents.104 The term ‘electronic agent’ permeates both legal 
literature and model regulations. Agency principles appear to provide automation with a solid theoretical 
framework: agents are instruments of the principal, intention and capacity belong to the latter, not the 
former.105 As agency relationships may arise by operation of law, the agent’s consent or the principal’s 
willingness to have his position changed are not required.106 Authority, both actual and apparent, is 
conferred by putting the computer into operation.107 Agency-based theories must, however, be discarded 
as relaying on the incorrect premise that computers are separate rights-and-duty bearing entities. There 
being no two separate persons, there can be no agency relationship. Agency constructs lead back to 
separation theories and the necessity to grant capacity to the computer. It is also forgotten that “apparent 
authority” relies on the perception of third parties.108 The more sophisticated the computer - the more 
transparent its operations. Third parties have no reason to believe they are transacting with an agent. It is 
therefore counter-intuitive to assume that they are analysing websites in terms of authority. Absent a 
perceived division into principal and agent, there can be no appearance of authority. To protect operators 
from unplanned or incorrect output, proponents of agency theories claim that operators are only liable for 
output, which appears to be within the scope of authority. Inadvertently, this approach imposes the 
burden of investigating back-office operations on the person least able to do so – the person interacting 
“with” the computer. The attribution of correct output to the operator is further justified on the basis of 
ratification.109 This approach, however, invites abuse: the operator can decide whether the output is 
advantageous in retrospect and selectively ratify some transactions.110 Again, ratification requires two 
separate entities and that the principal’s existence is known to the third party. 
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Last but not least, the validity of automated transactions is being questioned on the ground of lack 
human intention at the time of contract formation. It is forgotten that the parties’ minds need not meet in 
perfect simultaneity.111 A direct parallel can be drawn to vending machines: intention persists as long as 
the computer is held out. Computers do not make their “own” decisions, but execute earlier human 
decisions within the limits of pre-set parameters.112 The original expression of intention consists in 
programming and deploying the computer. Once manifested by holding out the computer, intention need 
not explicitly refer to all future transactions. Arguments based on the remoteness of human involvement 
conflate “intention” and “awareness,” as they imply that there is no intention if the operator is not aware 
of a particular transaction taking place.113   
Arguments justifying the necessity to “validate” automated transactions can be rebutted by a simple 
contention: the complexity or correctness of the original programming is as irrelevant as the subjective 
state of mind. The provenance of a statement need not be apparent from its contents. Quite the opposite: 
sophisticated computers will most likely generate statements identical to those made by humans.114 The 
only question is whether a reasonable person would think the other party intends to contract on the terms 
provided.115 The objective theory of contract disregards the fact that a statement was not only manifested 
but also generated by a computer. Both occurrences are transparent to the addressee and therefore 
irrelevant. Persons visiting a website cannot see (or imagine) the technological complexity of servers and 
databases, which operate in the background. This reasoning underlies the scarce case law on the 
subject.116 In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co v Bockhorst, computer errors were regarded as errors of its 
human controllers.117 The court in Thornton Shoe Lane Parking118 stated that the machine was only a 
presenter of the defendant’s offer. Law protects those who reasonably rely on the communications 
emanating from the computer, the latter being a “booking clerk in disguise.”119 By initiating the 
computer, operators accept that contracts concluded by the computer are binding on them - despite any 
malfunctions or programming errors. 120  
 
The protection from unplanned or incorrect output can be achieved by the classic principles of 
unilateral mistake121 or on the basis of lack of contractual intention.122 Where the addressee should be 
reasonably aware that a statement does not represent the intention of its maker, he is in the best position 
to reduce the costs of unexpected obligations.123 One cannot take advantage of appearances when the 
“actual reality of the situation is starkly obvious”124 or  “snap up” offers which cannot reasonably 
represent the intention of their makers.125 Problems arise, however, when computer-generated output 
remains within the bounds of commercial reasonableness, i.e. the other party has no reason to know that 
the output was not intended (i.e. incorrect). In such case, the decision turns on the question: was the 
mistake (malfunction) apparent to a reasonable man?126 A balance must be struck between objectivity 
and the imposition of a minimal investigative burden when a deal is “too good to be true.” Despite its 
unappealing simplicity, the analogy between websites and vending machines is correct. Automation 
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comports with the objective evaluation of contractual intention and with the possibility to express such 
intention in any manner. Contract law is indifferent to the fact that a message was not only transmitted but 
also generated by a computer. From the addressees perspective the statement is the same. Although 
theoretically redundant, the introduction of Section 15 into the ETA is praiseworthy as closing a long 
legal debate.  
2.4 Section 16 – Input Error 
Section 16, which follows CUECIC Article 14, recognizes the difficulties brought about by novel 
transacting interfaces in web-based transactions. It continues the protective theme from Section 14, albeit 
from a different perspective. Whereas Section 14 is tailored to the needs of website operators and shields 
them from overexposure, Section 16 is directed at persons interacting with websites.  It provides that 
where a natural person makes an input error in an electronic communication exchanged with the 
automated message system of another party and such system does not provide an opportunity to correct 
the error, that person has the right to withdraw the portion of the electronic communication in which the 
input error was made. This right of (partial) withdrawal applies if the person who made the error:  
 
(a) notifies the other party of the error as soon as possible after having learned of the 
error and indicates that he made an error in the electronic communication; and   
(b) has not used or received any material benefit or value from the goods or services, if 
any, received from the other party. 
 
 The above mechanism can only be invoked by natural persons interacting with automated 
systems. It does not apply to errors in the functioning of such systems. A clear dividing line must 
therefore be drawn between computer errors and input errors. The most common example of a “Section 
16 situation” is a person filling out an order form on a website and accidentally typing ‘11’ instead of ‘1.’ 
The provision does not cover situations like digilandmall, as in that case the problem was attributable to 
an error on the side of the person operating the automated system, not to an incorrect selection by the 
person interacting with the system.   
While the desirability of the mechanism contained in Section 16 cannot be questioned in limited 
circumstances, such as in consumer protection legislation,127 the principle established therein may be 
difficult to apply and produce further complications. The provision differs from the classic principles of 
contract law: parties are generally bound by their manifested intention and cannot retract previously made 
statements. In limited circumstances, when the existence or “quality” of a party’s intention can be 
questioned on the grounds of mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence or unconscionability, the whole 
contract may be subject to the right to rescind or be void ab initio. Contract law does not recognize a right 
to retract a statement once a contract has been formed. It must not be forgotten that in the scenario 
addressed by Section 16 a valid and enforceable contract might have come into being. The right to 
withdraw disregards the latter circumstance – the statement can be withdrawn before or after formation. 
The main weakness of Section 16, however, lies in the absence of any indication of the legal effects of 
withdrawal. Whether it would invalidate the contract depends on the nature of the retracted portion. In 
many instances, even a partial withdrawal may deprive the statement of its certainty and completeness 
thereby annihilating the entire transaction. If, for example, the item number or the item selection is 
withdrawn – the contract cannot stand as it is devoid of the contractual subject matter. It has been 
suggested that the right of “partial withdrawal” derives from the desire to preserve the contract to the 
extent possible, by focusing only on the portion of the message that contains the error.128 The ‘right to 
withdraw’ the relevant portion was preferred to a ‘right to correct’ the original statement. Allegedly, the 
right to correct would create an obligation on the side of the website operator to keep negotiations open 
for a new contract.129  
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It is difficult to categorize Section 16 within contract law and to anticipate the legal effects of partial 
withdrawal. The mechanism does not fit the principles of rectification as the latter pertains to a failure to 
correctly record the intention of both parties.130 Rectification relates to existing contracts, whereas partial 
withdrawal pertains to the antecedent question whether a contract has been formed or whether it can 
continue to exist. The absence of an opportunity to correct remotely resembles a vitiating factor as, in 
effect, it may prevent a contract from coming into being or annihilate what seems to be a valid contract. 
Despite the intuitive association of ‘input errors’ with ‘mistake,’ the former do not easily fit under any of 
the popular scenarios relating to contractual mistake. Only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. when an 
element of inducement or knowledge of the mistake is present,131 can a mistaken belief of one party 
produce legal consequences. Under the common law position, the contract would be allowed to stand 
unless the mistake or error must have been obvious to a reasonable person. Section 16 is not, however, 
intended to interfere with or alter the rules of mistake, especially regarding its consequences. Seemingly, 
the provision is designed to prevent mistakes, i.e. a discrepancy between real and expressed intention. If 
an opportunity to correct errors is provided, the right of withdrawal does not exist and any ‘errors’ are 
governed by traditional principles.132 Section 16 precedes any discussions of mistake and does not 
necessarily overlap with the said doctrine. After all, mistake pertains to incorrect intention, whereas 
Section 16 addresses a situation where the problem lies only in an incorrect manifestation of such 
intention. The provision also sidesteps the classic prerequisite of an operative mistake: 
“fundamentality.”133 The right to withdraw exists irrespectively of the importance of the erroneous 
statement. Quite the opposite: absent an opportunity to correct, the right to withdraw can be exercised on 
the basis of the smallest triviality. In other words, the provision disregards both intention and 
fundamentality.  
As an aside, it can be mentioned that although digilandmall related to a scenario where the input error 
(i.e. uploading the incorrect template to a web-server) was made by the party operating the automated 
message system, some observations made therein are transposable to situations where the error is made 
by a natural person. Ultimately, the problem concerns the broader question whether the error was or 
should have been apparent to the other party.134 As in the case of computer error, recourse can be had to 
the objective theory of contract. The contract’s existence can be denied when the addressee of the 
erroneous statement must have known that it did not represent the true intention of its maker. The 
objective test does not apply in favor of a person who knows the truth.135 Irrespective of whether the 
problem is discussed from the perspective of mistake or on the basis of lack of contractual intention the 
practical result is similar: there is no agreement. This approach is also buttressed by popular statements 
questioning the existence of the doctrine of mistake and treating the associated issues as part of the “offer 
and acceptance model.”136 Combining constructive knowledge and objectivity, the presence of an input 
error could easily translate into an absence of consensus. The problem with this seemingly simple 
solution lies in the fact that an evaluation of the “true intention” of a natural person cannot be undertaken 
by an automated system. Evaluating the objective reasonableness of a statement requires human review…  
The right of partial withdrawal is contingent on the absence of an opportunity to correct the error - not 
on the intention of the party who made the error. Absent such opportunity (assuming notice was provided 
and no benefit has been obtained), a natural person may retract virtually any statement - even if it was 
originally intended. In other words, the “error” may not have been an error. The provision was designed 
to address situations where a natural person types in ‘111’ or ‘11’ instead of ‘1.’ Unquestionably, it would 
be more difficult to imply constructive knowledge on the side of the website operator when the input error 
takes the form of ‘11’ instead of ‘111.’ Much will depend on the character of the transaction (commercial 
or consumer), the price and the contractual subject matter. Section 16, however, permits withdrawal in 
situations where the natural person typed in ‘2’ instead of ‘1’ or selected item X from the scroll down 
menu and later changed her mind having found the same item cheaper elsewhere. In both instances, the 
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original intention reflected the expressed intention. In both instances, however, the shopper can withdraw 
from the transaction as long as there was no opportunity to correct the input. Some practical 
considerations enter the picture. First, the immediacy of notice implies that the words “as soon as 
possible” are practically synonymous with “before any benefit has been obtained.” This may not cause 
many problems where physical goods must be dispatched but will be difficult in the case of virtual goods. 
The natural person may only have as much time as it takes to download the music, application or movie. 
Having chosen the correct method of communication (in terms of speed), the person trying to exercise the 
right to withdraw must also chose the correct, designated address – as per Section 13. If the chosen 
address was not designated, the effectiveness of notice will depend on the awareness of the operator of 
the automated message system. Given that the message system is automated, awareness of its human 
operator may be delayed or absent altogether.   Absent a separate indication of address for the purposes of 
notice of withdrawal, the provision is bound to create a cascade of practical and theoretical problems. In 
sum, Section 16 requires that whenever a web-interface is not equipped with an opportunity to correct 
input errors there must be a clear indication (i.e. designation) of an address where the withdrawal can be 
sent. The question arises: why would an operator who failed to provide a corrective mechanism bother to 
indicate an address for the exercise of the right to withdraw? 
 While Section 16 does not seem to directly interfere with principles of contract law, especially 
with the doctrine of mistake, its legal effect is difficult to evaluate as it creates a sui generis right that 
does not fit easily within the existing legal framework. It is not immediately apparent whether it will 
facilitate electronic transactions or constitute an additional theoretical hurdle in legal analysis. Apart from 
its implications for contract formation in web-based commerce, the provision will directly affect the 
design of transacting interfaces. Without judicial guidance, the provision is bound to result in uncertainty 
after the right to withdraw has been exercised.  
3. Conclusions: 
Certainty at last? Do the new provisions facilitate electronic contracting and contribute to the removal of 
existing uncertainties? Even a superficial overview of the Act and a simple attempt to apply it to email 
communications or web-based transactions reveal that in most instances, the amendments add an 
additional layer of complexity to the traditional analysis. This complexity derives from the difficulties in 
interpreting the provisions in light of the actual functioning of “electronic communications” and their 
interaction with the classic principles of contract law. It can hardly be concluded that the Act provides 
certainty or facilitates e-commerce. Crafting any “special” rules to address electronic methods of 
communication inevitably creates a dual regime within contract law: one for contracts formed by 
traditional means and one for contracts formed “electronically.” It is unclear whether the existence of 
such “duality” was intended or whether it constitutes an undesired side-effect of the amendments. It can 
even be questioned whether the new provisions can co-exist with “classic” contract law without creating 
analytical bottlenecks and interpretative problems. Given the broad scope of the term “electronic record,” 
the new provisions may affect transactions that are not otherwise perceived as “electronic.” 
The creation of default rules and presumptions tailored to specific technologies, such as those 
introduced by Section 14 with regards to invitations to treat, unnecessarily strengthens the perception that 
electronic transactions require different treatment or that contract law in its current state is unable to 
accommodate them. Contrary to popular belief, contract law contains a sufficient set of tools to absorb 
any developments in the way parties communicate intention. In accordance with classic contract doctrine, 
the intention of the parties remains paramount - irrespective of the manner the contract is concluded. The 
content of statement is more important than the method of its communication. In this sense, it is 
questionable whether any regulation is necessary in the first place.  The confirmation of the validity of 
automated transactions in Section 15 closes a lengthy argument that has been permeating legal literature 
for years. The admissibility of automated contracting derives directly from the basic principles of contract 
law and, theoretically, does not require confirmation. Irrespective of the foregoing, the practical effect of 
Section 15 will be beneficial or neutral. This, however, cannot be said about Section 13. Supplementing 
the traditional rules of establishing the time of formation with provisions defining “dispatch” and 
“receipt” does not enhance certainty in electronic transactions - especially given the broad meaning of 
“information system” and the reference to “control.” The provision downplays the complexity of modern 
communication technologies and fails to identify the real problems created by modern, network-based 
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communications. It simplistic approach to technology renders it difficult to apply in even most basic e-
commerce transactions. The division into “designated” and “non-designated” addresses further 
complicates the question regarding the time of formation of contracts concluded electronically by 
introducing a set of rules, which are absent in traditional contract law. The right to withdraw a portion of 
the statement in web-based transaction, as stipulated by Section 16, while providing an incentive for 
clearer transacting interfaces, affects the certainty of e-commerce by indirectly encouraging attempts to 
withdraw from the transaction. It also leaves a theoretical gap after the right of partial withdrawal has 
been exercised and creates potential for abuse:  an existing contract can be annihilated on the basis of a 
mere technicality.  
Sections 13, 14 and 16 set incorrect points of departure for examining the legal issues at hand.  The 
very existence of these provisions may inhibit the growth of e-commerce by imposing an additional 
analytical hurdle in evaluating transactions, which involve “electronic” methods of communication.  The 
proposed default rules must be regarded as either unnecessary or too simplistic to ensure certainty. It can 
be suspected that the sheer multiplicity of technical configurations renders it practically impossible to 
provide a one-size-fits-all regulation. The richness of “electronic” interactions can only be accommodated 
by a case-by-case analysis weighing the risks and interests of a given communication scenario.  
Given the above uncertainties, contracting parties are advised to include express provisions in their 
agreements, which would be tailored to the specific communication method deployed in a given 
transaction and prescribe the time of formation and/or the legal character of the individual acts. The 
parties can also explicitly exclude the operation of the ETA.137 Otherwise, the default settings provided 
by the Act are bound to introduce difficulties – especially when dealing with the establishment of the time 
of formation. This is a regrettable outcome. After all, “inefficient defaults only raise transaction costs 
unnecessarily” as the parties are compelled to contract out of them.138  
Legislation resembling the ETA should aim at modernizing individual statutes that may contain 
provisions incompatible with technological progress. Specific contractual issues should be left to 
common law developments. After all, facilitating legislation was not necessary to accommodate the post 
or telephone. The latter methods of communication, although revolutionary at the time of their 
introduction, were slowly absorbed under the existing regimes. Some uncertainty is always present when 
applying the principles of contract law to novel transacting scenarios – such as those encountered in 
electronic transactions. Frequently, this uncertainty is the result of a general discomfort with the 
communication technology in question – not the existence of any obstacles to its use.   
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